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nlResilience is often promoted as a boundary concept to integrate the social and natural dimensions of sustainability.
However, it is a troubled dialogue from which social scientists may feel detached. To explain this, we first scrutinize
the meanings, attributes, and uses of resilience in ecology and elsewhere to construct a typology of definitions.
Second, we analyze core concepts and principles in resilience theory that cause disciplinary tensions between the
social and natural sciences (system ontology, system boundary, equilibria and thresholds, feedback mechanisms, self-
organization, and function). Third, we provide empirical evidence of the asymmetry in the use of resilience theory in
ecology and environmental sciences compared to five relevant social science disciplines. Fourth, we contrast the
unification ambition in resilience theory with methodological pluralism. Throughout, we develop the argument that in-
commensurability and unification constrain the interdisciplinary dialogue, whereas pluralism drawing on core social
scientific concepts would better facilitate integrated sustainability research. oad o
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 INTRODUCTION
In search of resilience
Climate change is a reason to engage in sustainability research and to
clarify the scientific foundation of, and conditions for, doing integrated
research. As a contribution to this, we analyze why interdisciplinary
communication between the social and the natural sciences is difficult
and divisive, here exemplified by the ambition in resilience theory to
make resilience a boundary concept in sustainability research. To that
end, we critically explore four questions:
(i) What does resilience actually mean and how can it be defined?
(ii) Why is resilience problematic in social science and for under-
standing society?
(iii) To what extent does resilience theory close the disciplinary gap
that it aspires to?
(iv) Is there an alternative way forward to conduct integrated re-
search on sustainability?
In search of explanations for the troubled dialogue internal to the sci-
ences themselves, we first trace different disciplinary uses of resilience.
From this, we generate a typology of the four most salient types of
definition of the concept in resilience theory and social-ecological
thinking, some of which stand in the way of a constructive dialogue be-
tween disciplines. In the identifying incommensurability with social
science section, and as the bulk of our argument, we illustrate how
incommensurability and miscommunication are rooted in ontological
and epistemological differences between the social and the natural
sciences. As an aspect of this, we discuss why society and social rela-
tions cannot be readily cast in the ecological terms that resilience re-
searchers use to describe interaction in natural systems such as dynamic
equilibria, feedbacks, thresholds, and self-organization. In the in search
of resilience in scientific journals section, we present the results from
our bibliometric analysis of natural and social science journals showing
strong asymmetry in the presence of resilience. In theDiscussion section,
we discuss how the ambition in resilience thinking to overcome the dis-
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Olsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015ciplinary divide through unification is counterproductive from a social
science perspective; it would more likely be achieved through methodo-
logical pluralism. On the basis of our findings, we argue that there are
reasons to favor pluralism over unification as amethodological approach
to integrated research on social and natural dimensions of sustainability.
In the Conclusions section, we conclude with five key messages.RESULTS
On the meanings and attributes of resilience
The use of the word resilience has a long history replete with diverse
meanings ranging from bouncing, leaping, and rebounding, to human
resourcefulness, to elasticity and resistance properties in materials in-
cluding steel, yarn, and woven fabrics (1). In contemporary debates, it
is a commonly held view that resilience is concerned with the ability to
cope with stress or, more precisely, to return to some form of normal
condition after a period of stress.
Early on, ecological theory was associated with the equilibrium and
stability of ecosystems. In his seminal paper in 1973, Holling ques-
tioned the notion of a single equilibrium and stability and started pro-
moting resilience that he defined in a rather precise way: “Resilience
determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a mea-
sure of the ability of these systems to absorb change of state variable,
driving variables, and parameters, and still persist” (2). In 1998, Perrings
offered a more open definition of resilience: “in its broadest sense,
resilience is a measure of the ability of a system to withstand stresses
and shocks—its ability to persist in an uncertain world” (3).
Resilience has longer roots in psychology than in ecology (4). In
psychology, some scholars argue that resilience is a personal trait (5),
although it is most commonly understood as a process (6)—a dynamic
process of positive adaptation within the context of significant adver-
sity, trauma, tragedy, threats, or significant sources of stress (7). In the
case of chronic adversity, it refers to long-term outcomes, such as chil-
dren eventually achieving a normal adulthood (8). This meaning has
been called emergent resilience (9). More recently, resilience has been
used by psychologists to describe an individual’s reactions to potentially1 of 11
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 traumatic events (10). In some circles, this change shifted the focus
from individual resilience to include the role of social capital in com-
munities in which individuals are embedded (11). Research on com-
munity resilience includes insights on health and human development,
and can potentially be seen as an example of co-development with
resilience theory in the context of socio-ecological systems (SESs)
(12–14).
With regard to the wider spread of resilience thinking, interdis-
ciplinary scientists interested in SESs have incorporated resilience into
their thinking and define it as follows: “The ability of human commu-
nities to withstand external shocks or perturbations to their infrastruc-
ture, such as environmental variability or social, economic or political
upheaval, and to recover from such perturbations” (15). The tendency
to understand resilience as resistance to change is ubiquitous in the
literature, as exemplified by the following quotation from leading re-
silience theorists: “The more resilient a system, the larger the distur-
bance it can absorb without shifting into an alternate regime” (16). In
disaster management, it refers to multiple aspects ranging from ab-
sorbing and recovering from, to resisting, the effects of a hazard, as
well as preserving and restoring “essential basic structures and func-
tions” [(17), p. 24]. Such wide meanings may end up being contradic-
tory as in the notion of “restoring equilibrium and getting away from
it by moving to a new system state” [(1), p. 2710].
It is clear that resilience thinking describes important attributes of
ecosystems, of materials, and of human beings, that is, the ability to
cope with, and recover after, disturbance, shocks, and stress. However,
with popularity comes the risk of blurring and diluting the meaning
(18). From a scientific point of view, one might think that scientists
rooted in resilience research would try to safeguard the concept from
inconsistency and ambiguity because conceptual accuracy and pre-
cision are of fundamental importance and often considered a pre-
requisite in science (19). Conversely, the Resilience Alliance contributes
to ambiguity, as exemplified in the following quotation where trans-
formation is pointed out as crucial to maintain resilience: “the very dy-
namics between periods of abrupt and gradual change and the capacity
to adapt and transform for persistence are at the core of the resilience
of social-ecological systems (SESs)” (20). However, we take transforma-
tion, which seems to be contrary to what Walker et al. see as the ne-
cessity to avoid “shifting into an alternate regime” (16), to be in contrast
to resilience (21, 22). Recently, resilience thinkers address this ambiguity
in the meaning of resilience, which seems to include both change and
resistance to change, by arguing that it is the critics who misinterpret
or misunderstand the notion of transformation (23).
A major point of that discussion in resilience circles is whether
resilience is a normative concept or not; that is, is resilience “good”
or “bad,” or neither? The policy use of resilience is almost exclusively
normative (24), and proponents of resilience theory have recently
acknowledged that “we agree that the resilience literature often treats
resilience as something good” (23). However, the tendency to see
resilience and all that it entails as desirable is an important reason,
we argue, why social science focusing on social change over stability
has difficulties accepting the resilience concept. Given the controversy
around the normativity of resilience, the notions of “good” and “bad”
resilience need to be studied more (25). In addition, resilience aspires
to be an integrated framework to be used across the boundaries of the
natural and social sciences [(3), p. 511, (26), p. xxi], but that causes
tension especially in relation to agency, conflict, knowledge, and
power, which are core social science concepts. Social scientists haveOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015therefore argued that the application of resilience to social systems re-
quires more solid theoretical grounding (27).
A typology on resilience
At this point, we acknowledge the long history of the concept of
resilience with its many articulations, iterations, and positive attributes.
However, it is an elusive concept in need of structuring, so we suggest
a typology organized around two conceptual meanings on one axis,
and two attributes on the other, describing the four main types of def-
inition frequently used in the scientific literature (Table 1). The first
conceptual meaning refers to the ability of a system to cope with stress
and “bounce back” (BB); the second refers to the ability of the system
to “bounce back” and “transform” (BB-T). The first attribute is de-
scriptive implying that resilience is “neutral” (N), that is, neither good
nor bad, contrasted by a prescriptive attribute implying that resilience
is desirable and “good” (G). Each of the four distinct types is exem-
plified by one representative article.
Identifying incommensurability with social science
In the following five subsections, we identify core concepts and prin-
ciples in resilience theory that create theoretical tensions and method-
ological barriers between the natural and social sciences and thus stand
in the way of a constructive dialogue on knowledge integration between
disciplines. To evaluate the ontological commensurability of resilience
theory with social science, we examine the concepts and principles de-
ployed in resilience research in terms of their assumptions about so-
ciety and the standing of these assumptions in social science.
First: System ontology. In ecology, the concept of resilience is
associated with a system ontology and ecosystems as the target do-
main. Whereas some ecologists study ecosystems for the interactions
between predators and their prey, others see ecosystems as flows of en-
ergy. Neither of these “constructed systems” is intended as a complete
account of ecosystems. In the literature on SESs, the system under
study commonly has a prominent ecosystem component such as a
coral reef (28), fisheries (29), forests (30), grasslands (31), or wetlandsTable 1. Typology of resilience definitions in ecology and social-
ecological systems thinking.MeaningsAttributesDescriptive—
neutral (N)Prescriptive—
good (G)Bounce back BB-N BB-G(2) Holling, 1973.
Resilience and
stability of ecological
systems.(3) Perrings, 1998.
Introduction:
Resilience and
sustainable
development.Bounce back
and transformBB-T-N BB-T-G(16) Walker et al., 2006.
A handful of heuristics
and some propositions
for understanding
resilience in
social-ecological
systems.(20) Folke et al., 2010.
Resilience thinking:
Integrating resilience,
adaptability and
transformability.2 of 11
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 (32). The notion of system is indispensable to resilience, and having
decided on the phenomenon to be explained, the system boundaries
need to be defined. Beyond that, resilience is sometimes used to de-
scribe and analyze social entities such as institutions, organizations,
cities, or states (33). To take it even further, ecologists sometimes claim
that “ecological and social domains of social-ecological systems can be
addressed in a common conceptual, theoretical, and modelling
framework” (16). Even if the system ontology is essential in resilience
thinking, there are surprisingly few studies addressing resilience at the
system level. In a recent quantitative meta-analysis of 197 published
articles on resilience, Downes et al. (34) found an overwhelming focus
on the species or community level in ecological studies and on the
individual level in social science studies.
In the social sciences, system ontology is not new or unknown. Al-
though researchers studying social phenomena based on social theory
are reluctant to use systems as an ontological description of society,
they may use “system” analytically to study a specific aspect of society,
polity, or the economy such as the energy system, the party system, or
the tax system. To be noted here, some early social system theories
emanated from physics and biology. In 1935, in his book The Mind
and Society, the renowned economist Vilfredo Pareto formulated one
of the first social system theories in the form of “General Sociology.”
Here he claimed that: “My wish is to construct a system of sociology
on the model of celestial mechanics, physics [and] chemistry” [(35), p. 16].
In sociology, Talcott Parsons, another proponent of system theory,
was inspired by Pareto and the emerging system science in biology
(36). Intentionally or unintentionally, the current discourse on SESs
borrows many of its ideas about society from this early view of social
systems inspired by the natural sciences, which is now highly contro-
versial in contemporary social sciences (37).
The most prominent modern system theory in the social sciences,
especially in sociology, is without doubt Niklas Luhmann’s general
system theory rooted in functionalism (38). However, Luhmann’s no-
tion of system is very different from that of Parsons and also quite
different from the meaning of system in resilience theory. According
to Luhmann, a social system consists of nothing but communication;
neither material conditions nor human beings are part of it (39).
Luhmann’s systems are characterized by autopoiesis, meaning that
the system creates its own basic elements that make up the system.
For example, the economic system as we know it is based on money,
and money is created by the economic system. Without an economic
system that defines the value of money, it would simply be pieces of
paper, and without money, there would be no economic system. This
is very different from how we understand ecosystems.
Another characteristic of an autopoietic system is that its bound-
aries are determined by the system itself. In the economic system, any-
thing that is scarce and in demand has a price and is internal to the
system, whereas goods and services that are either ubiquitous or not in
demand have no price and are external to the system. Hence, an au-
topoietic system has no direct links to its environment; it is closed. How-
ever, under pressure from its environment, the system may change by
shrinking or extending its boundaries. In Luhmann’s system theory, the
environment (ecosystems for example) can never become part of society,
and society can never become part of the environment—the notion of
SESs is therefore incompatible with Luhmann’s systems theory (40).
Although Luhmann’s attempt to reconceptualize modern society is
“attractive, comprehensive and theoretically consistent,” it is, for sev-
eral reasons, highly controversial in social theory, and critics haveOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015pointed out that not all systems are as (functionally) autonomous
or closed as Luhmann described them (39). As a whole, the critique
points at the problem of using functional systems thinking to describe
and explain relations between entities and systems (41). This takes us
to the next point: the problem of defining system boundaries.
Before that, we should briefly mentionWorld System Theory (WST)
as yet another well-known system theory in the social sciences, with
the sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein as its most prominent theorist.
It developed in the 1970s out of Marxist thought and builds on depen-
dency theory emerging in the late 1960s as a critique of functionalist
modernization theory in development (42). WST is an important
source of inspiration to many environmental social scientists (43)—
and development thinkers alike—but it is hardly compatible with
resilience theory. From the following discussion on the similarity be-
tween resilience theory’s assumptions about society and those of func-
tionalism, it should be clear why WST and resilience seem incompatible,
especially because WST is fundamentally informed by a radical rather
than a conservative political agenda (44).
Second: System boundary. The ability to define boundaries is an
important prerequisite in “system ontology”; however, at times, this
can be a challenge. Not even planet Earth is an example of a system
with clear boundaries owing to its layered atmosphere. In some cases,
it is easier to define the system because it may have clear boundaries,
or the research focus may allow boundaries to be clearly stipulated. In
psychology, the system ontology is well established, and the most fun-
damental systems under study are (fairly) well defined such as the in-
dividual, the family, the local community, the school, and so forth. In
many instances, it is more difficult to settle the boundaries—in both
the natural and the social sciences. A forest, for instance, may have no
boundaries that can be unambiguously determined. It may be more or
less well connected with other forests, lakes, and rivers in such a way
that any suggested boundary will be arbitrary or artificial. At first
blush, a lake ecosystem is clearly separate from the surrounding ter-
restrial environment. However, some plants along the shoreline may
be either partially submerged or rooted in the surrounding land; am-
phibians move between the shoreline and the water; surrounding trees
drop leaves into the water, etc. [(45), chap. 6]. To take a further but
different example of the delineation problem, cognitive processes draw
on the external world to such an extent that an individual’s skin can
obviously not be taken to approximate the boundaries of an individual’s
cognitive system (46). The delineation of a system is not just a matter of
social or spatial location, and depending on the choice of theory, bound-
aries will vary. Hence, we must rely on other properties and recognize
how scales and social relations are interconnected with actors, institu-
tions, and structures beyond the “system.”
Generally, we seem to understand a system as an entity of a given
phenomenon that we want to describe, explain, or interact with—and
this has consequences for how we understand the system. Herbert
Simon (47) argued that the strength of connections between variables
can be used to decompose systems into distinct subsystems. Moreover,
it is often claimed (48) that a system is a set of elements standing in
reciprocal interrelation. However, even such systems depend to some
extent on pragmatic considerations (49). As an illustration, Collier and
Cumming [(50), p. 203] claim that “the difficulty of defining an eco-
system is complicated by the fact that any description of an ecosystem
is from the perspective of an observer.” This resonates with the social
science perspective arguing that boundaries, like theories, are constructed
by someone for some purpose (51). In case study design, researchers3 of 11
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 set boundaries on the basis of research questions, propositions gener-
ated from theory, meta-theoretical assumptions, etc.
With regard to boundaries, there is no sharp line of demarcation in
reality to explain perceived differences between natural or social
systems. Neither in nature nor in society are boundaries fixed unless
we first decide on the phenomenon to be described or explained. Prag-
matic considerations imply some degree of construction—in both so-
cial and natural contexts. There is thus a certain degree of reflexivity
among researchers who recognize that system boundaries are con-
structed, and that sometimes, for various reasons, resilience is contested.
In theory and practice, systems and system boundaries are essential
components of resilience, although there are many obstacles to
systems thinking inherent in contemporary social science. In particu-
lar, system boundaries depend on the assumption that there is a given
set of entities and that these are universally recognized across disci-
plines. However, in the natural sciences, a given set of entities is more
accepted than in the social sciences. It is tempting to downplay the
conceptual requirements of systems to make resilience applicable to
social phenomena, but that would be a clear example of blurring the
concept of resilience, which should be avoided because it would result
in a less scientific concept.
Whereas system is almost a universal concept in the natural sci-
ences, institutions are axiomatic, although interpreted variously, to so-
cial science and core to understanding social continuity and change
(52, 53). The use of an institutional lens on the integration of social
and natural dimensions could become a methodological linchpin to
connect the social and the natural sciences for the sake of sustainabil-
ity. This would require not only the use of rational choice institution-
alism, as represented by Ostrom (54) and often associated with SESs
(55), but also the involvement of historical, sociological, and discursive
institutionalism, which stress the material as well as ideational aspects
of society and nature and their dynamics (56). Different institutional
theories would treat the idea of system and system boundaries differently.
Third: Equilibria, thresholds, and feedback mechanisms. The
idea of multiple equilibria and thresholds is central to resilience theory
as seen in this quotation: “Social-ecological systems exhibit thresholds
that, when exceeded, result in changed system feedbacks that lead to
changes in function and structure” (16). This dynamic is often visual-
ized by a ball on an undulating surface with multiple concave shapes.
If pushed too hard, or if the walls are lowered, the ball may move into
another concave shape, illustrating that the system has exceeded some
critical threshold(s) and shifted into a new equilibrium. An example
could be a lake shifting from a vegetation-dominated clear state into a
turbid plankton-dominated state (33). The interesting question is
whether the lake has shifted into a new system, thus a system transfor-
mation, or whether the system is basically the same but with an altered
function. Using this as an analogy to social systems is problematic be-
cause here we take transformation to mean a process in which society
changes not only in function but more profoundly in terms of struc-
tures, institutions, or social relations: “after a transition, the society, or
a subsystem, operates according to new assumptions and rules, thus
indicating a range of new practices and not just an altered function”
[(21), p. 176].
The analogy of the ball and the undulating surface is problematic
in relation to social phenomena because of competing explanations and
paradigms in the social sciences. In ecological resilience, the undulating
surface reflects the current scientific understanding, whereas in the so-
cial sciences there may be no consensus on the “shape” of that “surface.”Olsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015Feedback is another central component of the “system ontology”
that is problematic in the study of society and social relations. In cy-
bernetics, there are two types of feedback mechanisms: negative feed-
back, which stabilizes the system (homeostasis), and positive feedback,
which causes exponential change. Applied to social phenomena, this
notion of negative and positive feedback is overly simple. Social enti-
ties interact back and forth in norm-based processes of continuously
interpreted (and reinterpreted) communication and interaction that may
or may not affect behavior—thus indicating less predictability and
greater complexity than simple positive or negative feedback (27, 57).
The structural complexity of ecological and social systems can partly
be conceived of in similar terms, but the feedback processes associated
with each are incomparable because feedback mechanisms in social
systems are primarily determined by agency, or structured agency, rath-
er than by structural forces (27). This is especially so because norms
influencing agency are dynamic constructs subject to continuous change
rather than to static structures (56).
Fourth: Self-organization. The principle of self-organization is a
further cornerstone of the resilience discourse (58). In ecology, self-
organizing systems are common and perceived as unproblematic
because there is often an overarching driver, the attractor, providing
the logic of self-organization. To exemplify this, all leaves in a deciduous
boreal forest orient themselves toward the sun to optimize the amount of
sunlight that they can capture, thus maximizing the uptake of solar
energy, which is an attractor of that system.
With regard to society, the most obvious example of self-organization
would be the “invisible hand,” which was first described in 1776 by
Adam Smith, stating that capitalist markets would self-regulate if left
on their own (59). According to Smith, the natural propensity of hu-
mans to “truck, barter and exchange” leads to a situation where every
man is a merchant and “the society itself grows to be what is properly
a commercial society” [(60), p. 22]. Even if Smith did not use the term
self-organization, what he depicts is almost a perfect illustration of
such a system. The outcome (= the market) is the result of a decen-
tralized and nonintentional process where the role of government is to
guarantee freedom, property rights, and security in a process that
should work even if participants are unaware and have no knowledge
of it (61).
Much later, in an argument in favor of market forces and against
radical (state-oriented) reformists, the economist Friedrich Hayek (62)
developed the idea of self-organization even further. However, such
views of society are contested by scholars outside the neoclassical para-
digm. When Polanyi (63) speaks of the emergence of a self-regulating
market, he stresses that it relies on strong state interventions, primarily
the commodification of land, labor, and money (63). He also argues
that Smith’s claim on man’s natural propensity to “truck, barter and ex-
change” is a myth created during industrialization. What appears to be
self-regulating by some is thus considered the result of political forces
and institutional change by others. As a further illustration, social sci-
ence offers a vast literature on power as a fundamental and omnipresent
force shaping and reshaping interactions, relations, and social (not self-)
organizations, implying various degrees and types of continuity or
change (64). In addition, the literature on agency, conflict, institution-
alism, structuralism, and other middle-range theories is rich, varied,
and frequently used.
Self-organization is aligned with rational choice theory as seen in
the works of Elinor Ostrom (54, 55, 65), who was a strong supporter
of and contributor to resilience thinking. However, rational choice is4 of 11
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 often criticized for leaning heavily on the two principles of methodo-
logical individualism: of seeing macro patterns as resulting from the
aggregation of decentralized choices and of seeing economic change as
determined by factor costs (land, labor, capital).
Resilience theory is rooted in complexity theory, wherein self-
organization is seen as the overriding organizing principle (58, 66).
A conspicuous example is given by Walker et al. (31) claiming that
“a characteristic feature of complex adaptive systems is self-organization
without intent … and although the dynamics of SESs are dominated
by individual human actors who do exhibit intent, the system as a whole
does not (as in the case of a market).” Proponents of complexity theory
argue that complex systems (for example, business systems and social
networks) can be understood by emergence—in terms of new config-
urations resulting from self-organization (67), whereas others say that
emergence refers to new patterns and properties resulting from itera-
tive human interaction (68). When self-organization is used in the social
sciences, it is mainly understood as a reaction to power asymmetries
and structural inequality such as in the formation of social movements
(69–71).
Fifth: The notion of function and functionalism. The under-
standing of function is a major source of divergence between the
natural sciences and contemporary social sciences, but this was not
always the case. In ecological sciences, function is a central theme of-
ten defined as the ecological mechanism that maintains the structure
and services produced by ecosystems, such as primary production,
decomposition, and trophic (food chain) interactions (72). The early
functionalists in the social sciences, such as the sociologist Durkheim
and the anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown, argued that the concept of
function, when applied to society, can be seen as an analogy between
social life and organic life (73). A meaning similar to that used by the
early functionalists is found in resilience theory where ecosystems
have four main functions (exploitation, conservation, release, and re-
organization), which according to certain dynamics are responsible for
the succession and transformation of ecosystems from one state to
another (74).
In the seminal book Panarchy [(74), p. 107], the definition of a social
system is taken from “The Social System” by Talcott Parsons (75), a
structural functionalist in sociology who argued that his principles
could be applied to many systems, not just social systems. Resilience
thinking resembles Parsons’ general theory wherein intra- and inter-
systemic relations are defined by cohesion, consensus, and order (41).
In particular, there are obvious similarities between the SES discourse
and Parsons’ AGIL scheme describing four core functions—or func-
tional imperatives—that serve to maintain stability and secure survival
of the social system [(41), pp. 241–242]: (i) adaptation (A)—a system
must adapt to the physical and social environment as well as adapt the
environment to its needs; (ii) goal attainment (G)—a system must de-
fine and achieve its primary goals; (iii) integration (I)—a system must
coordinate and regulate interrelationships of its components and strive
toward a cohesive whole; (iv) latency (L)—a system must furnish,
maintain, and renew itself and its individuals to perform their roles
according to social and cultural expectations.
As a further description and explanation of the AGIL model, mod-
ern societies have acted on all four components according to Parsons:
for adaptation, societies developed industries and markets as well as
science and technology; for goal attainment, societies developed polit-
ical institutions; for integration, societies developed civil society and
religion; and for latency, societies developed families and schools. ParsonOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015was later criticized for overemphasizing consensus, conformity, stability,
and reification. To address this critique, neofunctionalists incorpo-
rated more agency, dynamics, and conflict into this thinking (76).
A recent quotation from Ecology and Society may serve as an ex-
ample of the resemblance between resilience theory and Parsons’ func-
tionalism: “The crux of the problem of fostering sustainable, resilient
landscapes is thus the problem of designing or developing appropriate
institutions that will act flexibly, proactively, and at appropriate scales
to strengthen feedbacks that modify and moderate demand for eco-
system services and incorporate the trade-offs between human well-
being, profit, and the exploitation of ecosystems” [(77), p. 1143]. However,
the crux of the matter is not only to create functional institutions but
also, as known from institutional theory, that inefficient or ineffective
norms, rules, and values often persist because institutions are “sticky” and
not easily replaced nor designed, developed, or changed (78). There are
further concerns with functional definitions of institutions. First, the
emphasis on the functionality of institutions implies a conservative ap-
proach to social change (79). Second, the existence of malfunctioning
institutions is difficult to explain if their role is to perform the very
function that defines them (27). Third, the equilibrium tendencies in struc-
tural functionalism may not be helpful in a social science analysis (1).
As a reaction to the incapacity of functionalism, such as the in-
ability to explain rapid social change, various conflict theories rooted
in the ideas of Karl Marx, Max Weber, and George Simmel emerged
in the 1960s and asked other questions about society (80). According
to conflict theory, institutions are shaped by existing conflicts, power
(im)balances, and social stratifications in society, which in itself is seen
as highly dynamic rather than static as in functionalism (81). On the
basis of a wealth of empirical data, the further development of socio-
logical conflict theories has since then emphasized the importance of
detailed study of processes in society, thus moving away from the pro-
duction of grand theory and what was perceived as ideologically based
conflict theory (82). Similarly, the influence of functionalism waned
substantially in the 1960s (80) and some even declare it to be “dead
as a dodo” [(83), p. 37]. Notably, and as a peculiarity, functionalism builds
on a nondynamic consensus perspective of society, which echoes the
state of a steady equilibrium that resilience theory reacted against and
rejected in its own analysis of ecosystems (84).
The most fundamental obstacle here, we argue, is the difference in
how resilience theory and the social sciences understand society—in
terms of social systems, social relations, and social change. In essence,
resilience theory is implicitly based on an understanding of society
that resembles consensus theories in sociology, according to which
shared norms and values are the foundation of a stable harmonious
society in which social change is slow and orderly—and where, in an-
alog, resilience thus becomes the equivalent of stability and harmony
or the good norm. However, while previously seen as dominant in
sociological theory—though strongly contested, for example, by the
critical theory of the Frankfurt School—consensus theories have de-
clined dramatically since the 1960s (41), giving more space to conflict
theory and issues of diversity, inequality, and power. Conflict theories
emphasize conflicting interests between groups in society, meaning
that social order is maintained by (material or discursive) manipula-
tion and control by dominant and powerful groups, and that transfor-
mational change can develop from the tensions between these groups
and the redistribution of power. In functional approaches, the conserv-
atism is clear: change is understood as coming about due to continuous
progressive processes such as the division of labor or differentiation;5 of 11
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 conflict arises in reaction to these, and a stable society must contain
the unrest. This must be taken into consideration in any serious at-
tempt to bridge the social with the natural sciences, be it via resilience
theory and thinking or via other less unifying and thus more meth-
odologically and theoretically pluralist approaches.
Whereas most disciplines seek to avoid teleological explanations,
biology, and evolutionary biology in particular, is rife with functional
claims (85). The striking similarities between resilience theory and
rightly abandoned theories of functionalism (and structural function-
alism) in the social sciences, as also noted by others (1, 79), are one
reason why the resilience discourse does not fit the social sciences.
Resilience theory rests on functionalism as a theoretically superseded
understanding of society; furthermore, owing to its emphasis on self-
organization, it appears to be aligned with the contemporary neoliberal
economics paradigm (86, 87). This entails a proliferation of market-
based instruments for ecosystem management (88) as epitomized by
The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity initiative (TEEB) aiming
to help decision-makers recognize, demonstrate, and capture the values
of ecosystem services and biodiversity (89 [see also Brown (90)].
A preliminary conclusion
To summarize the argument so far, we conclude that despite its com-
pelling attractiveness in terms of its original coherence, simplicity, and
apparent completeness, there are problems in using resilience as a uni-
versal concept. Admittedly, it has analytical potential, especially in the
serious effort to promote integrated approaches across scales, sectors,
and spaces (25), but not everyone finds it helpful that resilience think-
ing seeks to combine adaptation (dynamic) with resistance (static) in
one framing concept (1). Moreover, whereas resilience theory aims to
prevent transitions—or rather, hinder the collapse of a productive
system—social theory commonly used in sustainability studies—from
transition theory to political ecology—aims to locate and analyze mul-
tilevel or multiscalar resistance against change while seeking to stim-
ulate social transformation (91). This incommensurability is problematic
for at least two reasons. First, sustainability research needs to consider
both continuity and change while also distinguishing between them
(76). Second, transformation for the sake of persistence of the system—
rather than transformation for profound change—appears counter-
intuitive to social science thinking. Whereas studies building on rational
choice, as found in the literature on SESs, have difficulties in identifying
and explaining change, studies drawing on, for instance, transition theo-
ry and discursive institutional theory seek specifically to identify initial
change by studying agency, or the thinking and speaking that precedes
agency (56). Agency, in turn, can be interpreted differently depending
on the use of analytical perspective, be it cultural, discursive, power-
based, or a rational choice (91). Furthermore, structures serve as both
outcome of and context for agency (76).
On the basis of the analysis thus far, we offer three main synthe-
sized reasons for why resilience is not attractive to nor easily integrated
with social science thinking: (i) the ontological presupposition to see
reality as a system with equilibria, feedbacks, and thresholds; (ii) the
principle of self-organization overshadowing agency, conflict, and
power; and (iii) the notion of function as foundational to resilience
theory while having lost its centrality in the social sciences.
A cautionary remark on the politics and metaphor of resilience
As resilience travels from being a descriptive—and initially a rather
precise—concept in ecology to become a normative notion in societyOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015(and policy), it becomes increasingly vague and wooly, whereas the
descriptive origin somehow gets lost (18). Further, in the attempt
“to make resilience a full-scale paradigm or even a science,” its explan-
atory power gets “pushed to represent more than it can deliver” [(1), p.
2713]. Owing to its malleability in science combined with its popular-
ity among powerful private or public actors, there is a risk of (un)in-
tentional scientific justification of particular policies, projects, and
practices. This creates a tendency in resilience theory to depoliticize
social change (92) as in a recent example where poverty is seen as a
stochastic dynamic process (93) rather than the outcome of political
and structural processes.
To exemplify this, resilience is increasingly adopted by influential
global organizations such as the United Nations Development Program
(24) and funding institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation (94)
as a basis for policy-making and deployment of funds. Because of the
difficulties of incommensurability synthesized above: system ontology,
and that assumptions of self-organization and function tend to hide
power, ignore the dynamics of conflict, and bracket agency. The use
and promotion of the resilience concept in policy making and funding
regimes concerned with development and sustainability transitions,
where issues of power, conflict, and agency are generally considered
central, is at best inappropriate. If oppressive power or a denial of agen-
cy cannot be questioned, it is unlikely that they can be understood, no
less changed.
For these reasons and the fact that resilience appears conservative
when extended to social change and social relations (95), we need to
acknowledge “the politics of resilience” [(25), p. 48]. This can be done
by asking specific questions on resilience “of what” and resilience “for
whom” as explicitly expressed by Cote and Nightingale [(79), p. 479].
One person’s resilience may be another person’s vulnerability (1). This
becomes particularly problematic in the context of poverty, where re-
silience has serious limitations: it is not a pro-poor concept; there is no
automatic connection between resilience building and poverty reduction;
efforts to reduce poverty cannot simply be replaced by building resilience
that does not offer any direct road out of poverty; and finally, emphasis
on system-level resilience may work against the interest of people who are
poor (25).
Larson (96), himself an ecologist, argues that the integration of
ecology with ethics and society is facilitated by the presence of meta-
phors in ecology—such as competition, invasion, and resilience—that
originated in society. These metaphors are frequently used by ecolo-
gists to describe and explain complex processes and systems dynamics
including their expected, or even desired, outcomes (96). They operate
as “feedback metaphors,” which come from everyday parlance, are ap-
plied in science, and then feed back into society again. However, there
are both philosophical problems and social challenges associated with
this. The choice of metaphors is not only epistemological but also eth-
ical and performative, resulting in actions and real social consequences
(96). Metaphors highlight some aspects while hiding others, thus blur-
ring the line between fact and value. Because of the way metaphors
operate, they create a “tension between neutrality and advocacy”
[(96), p. 142]; facts and values as well as science and society are inter-
twined. When resilience as a metaphor becomes widespread, this has
implications for social science and society as we argue herein.
In search of resilience in scientific journals
Having shown theoretically why it is unlikely that resilience would appeal
to contemporary social science, we will now demonstrate empirically6 of 11
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othat it has not appealed. The evidence
that resilience does not at present close
the gap between the natural and social
sciences emerged from our bibliometric
analysis of the use of “resilience” AND
“ecology” as well as “resilience” AND “sys-
tem” in the 10 highest-ranked journals in
seven fields: ecology and environmental
studies, plus five social science disciplines
all addressing sustainability and engaging
with integrated or interdisciplinary ap-
proaches. According to the emerging pattern,
the resilience discourse is asymmetrically
present in ecology and environmental stu-
dies as compared with the other five disci-
plines (Fig. 1).
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 sustainability challenges and despite its rapid spread from systems
ecology to wider debates on SESs and sustainability, it is not widely
taken up by the 10 most influential journals in each of the five selected
social sciences (see the Supplementary Materials).
From the bibliometric analysis, we draw four conclusions. First, the
concept of resilience is commonly used in the entire field of ecology as
illustrated by the large number of references to resilience in most of
the 10 most highly ranked journals in the field (Table 2). This sup-
ports the idea that the concept of resilience has helped to unify ecology
as a discipline. Second, outside ecology, we see that the vast majority
of articles on resilience appear in environmental studies and, to some
extent, also in geography. Here, and as shown in Table 2, two journals
dominate the resilience debate completely—Ecology and Society, which
has published on resilience since its inception in 2003, and Global
Environmental Change (GEC), which started to publish widely on
social-ecological resilience in connection with a special issue in 2006
on resilience, vulnerability, and adaptation (97). Third, the promotion
of resilience theory is closely related to one particular organization, the
Resilience Alliance, whose official journal is Ecology and Society. In
addition, the Editor-in-Chief of GEC for the period July 2004 to De-
cember 2013 is a member of the Resilience Alliance. And fourth,
resilience theory and thinking is not common in the main social sci-
ence journals. Hence, it is safe to argue that resilience does not cur-
rently engage the core of social sciences. Despite increasing popularity,
we conclude here that resilience theory is a unifying concept in eco-
logical and environmental sciences but not across the social and
natural science divide.DISCUSSION
Scope for a better dialogue: Using pluralism instead
of unification
Integrated research may offer (better) understandings of and re-
sponses to complex demands of the contemporary world such as
climate change. To understand the conditions for how to build
integrated knowledge across disciplinary domains, such as the
natural and social sciences, we make a distinction between two dis-
tinct types of scientific knowledge integration—pluralism and
unification—and then show how pluralism allows problem feeding asOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015a fruitful strategy in interdisciplinary research, whereas unification
can easily slip into not-so-useful scientific imperialism. Problem
feeding occurs when a problem arises or is discovered in a disci-
pline that cannot solve it but can import the necessary tools to
solve it or export it to another discipline that may find a solution.
In the natural sciences, there are many examples of such interac-
tion, one of which is the recent construction of the nanoscope
(awarded the 2014 Nobel Prize in chemistry). It was developed when
chemists and physicists worked together to help physiologists study pro-
cesses inside individual cells, such as pathogens, or interaction between
individual molecules. Scientific pluralism thus appears when several dis-
ciplines contribute particular theories, methods, and/or questions to
solve problems.
According to scientific pluralism, the ultimate goal of scientific in-
quiry is not (necessarily) to establish a single theory (98). Pluralism is
useful in situations where no unified theories are available to explain a
phenomenon or where the phenomenon can only be explained by
multiple theories (99, 100). Also, to be noted here, problem feeding
does not necessitate broad unification—not even in its most powerful
bilateral form where both problems and solutions are transferred be-
tween disciplines (101–103).
Disciplinary imperialism is usually thought of as an illicit infringe-
ment, such as when one discipline attempts to explain phenomena or
solve problems in a domain belonging to or associated with another
discipline (104–106). As an example, the economist G. S. Becker ar-
gues that the decision to have children can be expressed as a utility
maximization function with three variables: the number of children,
their quality, and the rate of consumption of all other commodities
(107). As another example, sociobiologists (108) sought to explain so-
cial behavior in terms of natural selection and thus believed that they
could replace social science theories (109).
Serious cases of scientific imperialism are reductive in the sense
that they tend or aim to exclude alternative (even compatible) expla-
nations and solutions (110–112). Here, inferior explanations or pro-
blem solutions outcompete superior ones (112). All kinds of unification
are not necessarily imperialist (in this negative sense), but there is al-
ways reason to worry about imperialism in situations where a single
theory is claimed to account for persistent social problems such as
poverty or complex phenomena such as the impacts of climate change
and the responses in society.0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Ecology
Environmental Studies
Geography
Anthropology
Sociology
Poli!cal Science
Economics Resilience AND social AND ecological AND system       
Resilience AND system
Resilience AND ecological 
Fig. 1. Number of articles, 2001–2013, containing “resilience” and (Boolean “AND”) combinations
of “ecological” and “system” in the 10 highest-ranked journals (ISI) in seven relevant scientific dis-
ciplines or fields. Data file S1 contains a complete list of data.7 of 11
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 The claims made in resilience theory (to close the gap to the social
sciences) can be classified as an attempt of unification via disciplinary
imperialism. To substantiate this, we refer to the fact that resilience
often appears in contexts where discipline-bridging and integration
is sought. In the influential book Panarchy, Holling and Gunderson
(113) seek to develop a general theory of change, and while doing
so, they express concerns that “approaches” in which resilience has
no role are partial in the sense that “[t]hey are too simple and lack
an integrative framework that bridges disciplines and scales” [(113), p. 8].
Similarly, resilience theory suggests that “critical changes in social-
ecological systems are determined by a small set of three to five key
variables, i.e., the ‘rule of hand’” (16). Further, they claim that one wayOlsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015to put in place “robust foundations for sustainable decision-making” is
through the “search for integrative theories that combine disciplinary
strengths while filling disciplinary gaps” (16). Other authors are more
explicit. Charles Perrings, for instance, notes that the concept has
broad appeal for both natural and social sciences: “while the notion
of system resilience has its roots in ecology, it is concerned with
something that is common to any stochastic evolutionary system”
[(114), p. 511]. In another influential volume, Gunderson and Pritchard
treat resilience as a “unifying concept in both ecological and social sys-
tems” [(26), p. xxi].
Together, these examples may illustrate the integrative potential
but more so the unification ambition in resilience theory. Here, weTable 2. Articles, since 2001, containing the term “resilience” AND (Boolean) various related terms in the 10 highest-ranked journals (ISI) in
each of the three scientific disciplines/fields where resilience appears most frequently. Source: ISI Web of Science: 1 May 2014.Ecology
R
e
esilience,
cological
(%)
Resilience,
system
(%)
R
eesilience,
social,
cological,
system (%)Environmental
studiesResilience,
ecological
(%)Resilience,
system
(%)
R
eesilience,
social,
cological,
system (%)
Geography
Resilience,
ecological
(%)Resilience,
system
(%)
R
eesilience,
social,
cological,
system (%)Ecology Letters 16 12 15 Nature
Climate
Change1 1 0 Global
Environmental
Change80 83 82Annual Review
of Ecology,
Evolution, and
Systematics1 1 0 Annual
Review of
Environmental
Resources1 2 2 Progress in
Human
Geography5 4 5Trends in Ecology
and Evolution10 10 25 Review of
Environmental
Economics
and Policy0 0 0 Transactions
of the
Institute of
British
Geographers4 2 3Frontiers in
Ecology and the
Environment22 24 55 Global
Environmental
Change16 19 16 Economic
Geography0 0 0Ecological
Monographs4 5 0 Journal of
Environmental
Economics and
Management1 1 0 Journal of
Economic
Geography0 1 0The ISME Journal 2 2 0 Energy
Journal0 0 0 Antipode 1 0 0Global
Ecology and
Biogeography1 2 0 Wiley
Interdisciplinary
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Geography0 0 0Global Change
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Politics1 0 1 Global
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 propose that it is partly this ambition in combination with the in-
commensurability that has given rise to the problems that constitute
our central argument. First, many of these difficulties arise from the
inappropriate extension of concepts from the natural sciences to society.
These concepts entail similar assumptions to both functionalism and
neoclassical economics, which have been found to be highly proble-
matic by social science as seen already from the 1950s when develop-
ment economics (and other development theories) emerged in reaction
to, and as an alternative to, neoclassical economics. Second, given the
dominance of economics, and particularly neoclassical theory, in the
social sciences, it is likely that associated concepts appear as given
for ecologists unfamiliar with the diversity within social science.
In contrast to unification, we advocate pluralism. Rather than see-
ing resilience as a grand or unifying theory, it should be seen (and
used) as a middle-range theory compatible with some, but not all,
ontologies (91). In essence, we argue that there are two main barriers
for resilience thinking to bridge the natural and social sciences, as it
aspires to do. First, the aspiration of a “unifying theory” is contested
because the idea of the unity of science has long been controversial—
especially after the postmodern turn, which advocated diversity and
criticized grand theory for suppressing alternative views and voices
originating in less influential parts of society. Second, the combination
of unificationist ambitions and issues of incommensurability is partic-
ularly problematic. Incommensurability of the ontological type that we
have focused on here effectively blocks unification. This is best repre-
sented by how resilience thinking recreates functionalism, which is
now rightly outdated in contemporary social sciences (41). o
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Our analysis has illustrated the problems of using resilience as a uni-
versal and unifying concept, and it has explained why social scientists
lack research-strategic incentives to use and fully engage with resil-
ience theory and thinking. In sum, we contribute five conclusions to
the debate on resilience:
(i) Definitions of resilience vary from concise to comprehensive,
from coherent to internally contradictory, from precise to vague, and
from descriptive to normative to predictive—but after scrutiny can
be categorized into a typology of four distinct types (see Table 1).
(ii) The incommensurability between the natural and social sci-
ences constrains the dialogue in two ways: the resilience vocabulary
does not fit into the social sciences, whereas core concepts and theories
in social science—such as agency, conflict, knowledge, and power—are
absent from resilience theory.
(iii) Given its insensitivity to theoretical development of the social
sciences and lack of attention to agency, conflict, knowledge, and
power, resilience can become a powerful depoliticizing or naturalizing
scientific concept and metaphor when used by political actors.
(iv) Resilience is a unifying concept within ecology and environ-
mental studies but not in the social sciences (see Fig. 1 and Table 2).
(v) The unifying ambition in resilience theory and thinking to go
beyond natural science is counterproductive to successful interdisci-
plinary and integrated research.
Finally, we underline that far-reaching unification as an approach
to integrated research can easily result in scientific imperialism—
which is arguably how resilience theory has been perceived from
the perspective of the social sciences. To establish fruitful interdis-Olsson et al. Sci. Adv. 2015;1:e1400217 22 May 2015ciplinary collaboration, such as problem feeding, pluralism is quite
sufficient and perhaps preferable (103), especially in integrated re-
search on complex sustainability challenges in times dominated by
neoliberal ideology.MATERIALS AND METHODS
The article is based on two kinds of data related to two types of in-
vestigation. Our theoretical investigations are based on a systematic
analysis of how resilience is used, in ecology and beyond, in attempts
to bridge the natural and social sciences, as well as a critical scrutiny of
core concepts and principles in resilience theory.
For the bibliometric analysis, we used the ISI Web of Knowledge/
Science. As a first step, we identified the 10 most influential journals
(as measured by the Article Influence Score) in each of seven scientific
categories: Ecology, Environmental Studies (social science), Geography
(social science), Anthropology (social science), Sociology, Political Sci-
ence, and Economics.
We then searched these journals for articles published between
1 January 2001 and 30 April 2014 with the following Boolean combi-
nations: (i) resilience AND ecological; (ii) resilience AND system; (iii)
resilience AND social AND ecological AND system.
We searched for these words in the title, key words, and abstract.
The full data set is available as data file S1 (MS Excel).SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
full/1/4/e1400217/DC1
Data file S1. Complete list of journals used in the bibliometric analysis including the number of
articles for each combination of search terms.REFERENCES AND NOTES
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